changing economic policy, it is possible to assess what supply side policy really means and how the policies adopted under that banner have fared.
The term supply side economics originated as a way of describing an alternative to the demand side emphasis of Keynesian economics. The essence of Keynesian analysis is its conclusion that the level of national income and employment depend on the level of aggregate demand and that easy money and expanded budget deficits, by stimulating demand, can increase output and employment. Although this may have been an appropriate emphasis during the depression years of the 1930s when Keynes developed his theory, by the 1960s and 1970s it was clear to most economists that it was wrong to focus exclusively on demand and to ignore the factors that increase the potential supply of output --capital accumulation, technical progress, improvements in the quality of the labor force, freedom from regulatory interference, and increases in personal incentives. Many of us also concluded that the *Professor of Economics, Harvard University and President of the National Bureau of Economic Research. This paper was prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association on December 29, 1985 , at the session entitled "Supply Side Economics: What Remains?" persistently high level of measured unemployment did not reflect inadequate demand but was due to government policies like unemployment insurance, welfare restrictions, and the minimum wage that reduced the effective supply of labor.
In all of these ways, many of us were supply-siders before we ever heard the term supply-side economics. Indeed, much of our "supply side economics" was a return to basic ideas about creating capacity and removing government impediments to individual initiative that were central in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and in the writings of the classical economists of the nineteenth century. The experience of the 1930s had temporarily made it easy to forget the importance of the supply factors but by the 1970s they were returning to the mainstream of economics.1
It is important therefore in any discussion of supply side economics to distinguish the traditional supply side emphasis that characterized most economic policy analysis during the past 200 years from the new supply side rhetoric that came to the fore as the decade began.
I.
The Shift in Policy
Economic policy took a few hesitating steps in the traditional supply-side direction in the late 1970s with deregulation in the transportation industry, a significant reduction in the tax on capital gains, and the partial taxation of unemployment compensation. But it was only in 1981 that Congress enacted the major tax bill that has become the centerpiece of supply-side economics.
1These ideas are discussed in Feldstein (1981 Feldstein ( , 1982 . These spending reductions were significant not only because they released resources that could be used to finance tax rate reductions but also because they were often achieved by shrinking programs that in themselves had adverse incentive effects.
President Reagan also provided strong support for the anti-inflationary Federal Reserve policies. The sharp fall in inflation between 1980 and 1982 significantly reduced the effective tax rates on the return to corporate capital, increasing the real after-tax return to savers as well as reducing the uncertainty of saving and investment.2
II. Excessive Claims
These policies were a major step in the direction recommended by supply side economists of both the new and old varieties. What distinguished the new supply siders from the traditional supply siders as the 1980s began was not the policies they advocated but the claims that they made for those policies.
The traditional supply siders --and, although I dislike labels, I
consider myself one of that group --were content to claim that the pursuit of such tax, spending and monetary policies would, over the long run, lead to increased real incomes and a higher standard of living. We recognized that the key to this process was increased saving and investment and knew that that would take a long time to have a noticeable effect.3
The "new" supply siders were much more extravagant in their claims. They projected rapid growth, dramatic increases in tax revenue, a sharp rise in saving, and a relatively painless reduction in inflation. The height of supply side hyperbole was the "Laffer curve" proposition that the tax cut would actually increase tax revenue because it would unleash an enormously depressed supply of effort. Another remarkable proposition was the claim 2The effects of inflation on effective tax rates on investment in plant and equipment are analyzed in the papers collected in Feldstein (1983a) . 3Some of us were also nervous about the magnitude of the enlarged tax cut that emerged from the bargaining between the Congressional Democrats and Republicans. I advocated making a large part of the personal tax cut an immediate indexing of the tax brackets (to eliminate the risk of a real tax cut that was either bigger or smaller than needed to offset bracket creep during the years 1981 to 1985) and phasing in much of the remaining tax cut only as spending cuts were achieved. that even if the tax cuts did lead to an increased budget deficit, that would not reduce the funds available for investment in plant and equipment because tax changes would raise the saving rate by enough to finance the increased deficit. It was also claimed that the rapid rise in real output that would result from the increased incentive to work would slow the rate of inflation without the need for a rise in unemployment because the increased supply of goods and services could absorb the rising nominal demand. The new supply siders were naively optimistic when they claimed that the double digit inflation of 1980 and 1981 could be halved in a few years without any increase in unemployment simply by increasing output enough through improved incentives to absorb the excess demand.
Most of the new supply-siders have now conveniently forgotten the substantial discrepancy between their growth forecast and the subsequent experience. But some of the supply-side extremists even claim that the recovery was delayed because individuals preferred to "consume leisure" and were waiting to return to work until the final stage of the tax rate reduction had occurred. Anyone who believes that that explains the 10.7 percent unemployment in December 1982 has not studied the data on the composition and timing of unemployment or on the relation between the spending upturn and subsequent reductions in unemployment. And those who wish to believe that the cut in the tax rate stimulated a major increase in the number of people wanting to work will be disappointed by the data on labor force participation rates.
During the first four quarters of the recovery, real GNP increased at about the average pace of the previous recoveries. In the second year of the recovery, the rise in GNP exceeded the past norm. But now, 11 quarters after the recovery began, the cumulative rise in GNP has settled back to the middle of the range of past recoveries.
How much of the recovery has been due to the stimulus to increased supply that was provided by the new policies?5 I have already commented on the lack of evidence of an induced increase in the number of people wanting to work.
But it would be equally wrong to view the recovery as the result of the fiscal stimulus to demand as some traditional Keynesians have done (e.g., Tobin (1984) ).
In fact, the rise in nominal GNP since 1982 can be more than fully explained by the traditional relationship to the lagged increase in money (Ml). The division of the nominal GNP increase between real GNP and inflation was, however, more favorable than would have been expected on the basis of past experience; somewhere around 2 percent of the 15 percent rise in real GNP since the recovery began cannot be explained by the increase of nominal GNP and the past pattern of inflation and might therefore be attributed to supply side factors. However, the rise in the exchange rate fully explains the relatively favorable inflation experience and leaves no unexplained rise in real GNP. Of course, it might be argued that supply side factors contributed to the dollar's rise. Only further research will resolve whether supply side influences have contributed to the rise in real GNP since 1981.
5The remainder of this section is based on Feldstein (1986).
-8-Let me emphasize that, to a traditional supply sider like me, the positive but apparently modest supply-side effect is neither surprising nor disappointing. Although we would expect some increase in work effort from the reduction in the highest marginal tax rates, past evidence all points to relatively small changes. The favorable effects of improved incentives for saving and investment can only be expected after a much longer period of time.
IV. Tax Revenue
Perhaps the most dramatic claim of some of the new supply siders was that an across-the-board reduction in tax rates would be self-financing within a few years because of the increased output that results from the enhanced after tax pay.6 It is, of course, very difficult to disentangle the effects of the tax legislation from other things that influenced tax revenue. But a very careful study by my colleague Lawrence Lindsey (1985a,b) indicates that in 1982 the response of taxpayers did offset about one-third percent of the effect of the tax cut on Federal receipts.
Lindsey reports that about 65 percent of the induced offsetting rise in tax revenue reflects higher pretax wages, salaries and business profits than would have been anticipated without the change in tax rates and tax rules, 25 percent reflects an increase in realized capital gains, and the remaining 10 percent is due to reductions in various itemized deductions. These induced offsetting effects are very small among taxpayers with incomes below $20,000.
Only among taxpayers whose initial marginal tax rates exceeded 50 percent was there evidence that the rate reduction did not reduce federal revenue at all. 6The administration never made such a claim although the unusually strong real growth that it predicted for the first five years would have been sufficient to recoup between half and three-quarters of the proposed 30 percent tax cut.
-.9-Only time will tell whether this first-year tax response overstates the long term effect (because it reflects a shift in the timing of income receipts and deductions rather than a more fundamental change in behavior) or understates the long-term effect (because it takes time for taxpayers to adjust their behavior to new tax rules). But the effect for 1982 is clearly an economically significant one. Although the increase in taxable income fell far short of the claims made by the over-optimistic new supply-siders and may have been due in large part to a restructuring of income (e.g., from fringe benefits to cash) rather than an increase in work effort, the rise in taxable, income is a reminder that the traditional revenue estimation method that ignores the behavioral response to tax changes can be very misleading (Feldstein 1983b ).
V.
Conclusion
The experience since 1981 has not been kind to the claims of the new supply side extremists that an across-the-board reduction in tax rates would spur unprecedented growth, reduce inflation painlessly, increase tax revenue and stimulate a spectacular rise in personal saving. Each of those predictions has proven to be wrong.
But it would be unfortunate if this gave a bad reputation to the traditional supply side verities that the evolution of a nationts real income depends on its accumulation of physical and intellectual capital and on the quality and efforts of its workforce. Moreover, nothing about the experience since 1981 would cause us to doubt the time-honored conclusion of economists that tax rules influence economic behavior and that high marginal tax rates -P10-reduce incentives.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the reduction in tax rates did have a favorable effect on work incentives and on real GNP and that the resulting loss of tax revenue was significantly less than the traditional revenue estimates would imply. Traditional supply side considerations are undoubtedly important in the design of economic policies in general and of tax policies in particular. But the miraculous effects anticipated by some of the new supply side enthusiasts were, alas, without substance.
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